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ABSTRACT 
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literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social 
psychology.  Chapter III examines key elements of influence derived from the Huk 
Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several 
relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence 
identified in prior chapters, to develop a new grassroots influence model 
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I. INTRODUCTION: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS - THE STRATEGIC UTILITY 
OF SPECIAL FORCES  
Unconventional scenarios place a premium on non-kinetic forms of 
influence…Influence cannot be achieved without a comprehensive 
understanding of the cultural context in which the operations are planned.1 
 
A. STRATEGIC UTILITY OF SPECIAL FORCES 
The strategic utility of Special Forces (SF) lies in their ability to influence the 
emotions, motives, objective reasoning and behavior of a target audience in an 
unconventional warfare (UW) environment, where the ability to influence populations is 
critical to accomplishing tactical and operational objectives. To appreciate the strategic 
utility of SF, consider the following:  unconventional warfare is a distinct type of conflict, 
rather than simply a form of warfare on a spectrum of low intensity and high intensity 
conflict whose polar opposite is conventional warfare.2 The relevance of this point is that 
the intensity spectrum of conflict implies that the same force can be used to accomplish a 
mission, utilizing differing tactics appropriate for the intensity level of the particular 
conflict. However, the vastly different characteristics of conventional and unconventional 
warfare suggest the need for a separate force whose focus is on one or the other type of 
warfare.  
Conventional warfare is commonly defined as a form of warfare between two or 
more states whose forces are well defined. The primary purpose of conventional warfare 
is to defeat the opponent’s military forces. As characterized by the Trinitarian model of 
war, conventional warfare is managed by the state, executed by established armed forces 
(field armies), and the people (civilians) are not involved. On the other hand, 
unconventional warfare is commonly defined as war between a state and a non-state 
actor, characterized by an asymmetrical material resource advantage for the state and an 
                                                 
1 “Creating Stability in an Unstable World,” Irregular Warfare II Conference Report, General Alfred 
M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center, Quantico VA, July 11-12, 2005. 
2 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar in 
Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005 
2 
asymmetrical information advantage for the non-state actors.3 In UW the people 
(civilians) become the center of gravity because they provide the non-state actors with the 
information advantage through passive or active support. A primary focus for UW is 
controlling the population. Therefore, UW requires a distinctly different force trained in 
the elements of UW.   
Because of the different characteristics of UW and conventional warfare, utilizing 
a conventional force, whose primary focus is the destruction of the opponent’s military 
force and who are not specifically trained in the elements of UW, would prove inefficient 
in an UW conflict. As Alfred H. Paddock suggests, “Regular divisions were never 
designed or equipped for unconventional warfare, so special units, training, and doctrine 
would be necessary for such a task.”4 Furthermore, as the quote at the beginning of this 
chapter states, unconventional scenarios place a premium on non-kinetic forms of 
influence. The validity of this statement can be attributed to the increased involvement 
and role of the civilian population in an UW environment as compared to conventional 
warfare.  
B. THE NATURE OF UW  
Controlling the population is the critical factor in an unconventional warfare 
environment. The most significant advantage enjoyed by opponents of the state in this 
environment is the information advantage, which is derived from the ability to control a 
population and subsequently secure support. The information advantage provides a cloak 
of invisibility for the insurgents which allows them to attack when and where it is most 
beneficial to their objectives and survivability. Without the protection and support 
provided by the controlled population, an opponent with superior technology and 
resources could easily find, fix, and defeat the resource inferior insurgent force.5  
Therefore, success in an UW environment requires the ability to control the 
population. The methods and techniques used to control a target audience can be 
categorized as either force (kinetic) or persuasion (non-kinetic), with each possessing its 
                                                 
3 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar in 
Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005 
4 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. US Army Special Warfare: Its origins. (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press 1982), 1. 
5 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Gordon McCormick’s Seminar in 
Guerrilla Warfare, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005 
3 
distinct characteristics. This research focuses on a non-kinetic, grassroots approach to 
controlling a target audience through the art of influence. There are two important 
reasons for the non-kinetic focus here.  First, the military in general is well versed in and 
predisposed to use kinetic means of control.  Second, it may be assumed that non-kinetic 
means of influence will have longer lasting effects and are less likely to produce 
blowback.  
Persuasive, non-kinetic, forms of control can be classified as psychological 
operations.6 Although psychological operations (PSYOP) units can work in support of 
Special Forces in a UW environment, the primary facilitator of the grassroots 
psychological operations will be SF.  The reason for this is because SF habitually 
operates within the UW environment through day to day contact with the indigenous 
population. Therefore, they are in a position to have the greatest psychological impact on 
the target audiences (TA). Furthermore, SF has an historical connection, from its 
inception, with psychological operations. 
C. THE SPECIAL FORCES AND PSYOP CONNECTION 
In WWII the United States realized that it needed the ability to undermine the 
enemy’s will to fight using psychological techniques.7   The historical link between 
special operations and psychological warfare can be traced back to the establishment of 
the Office of Coordinator of Information (COI) and its first director Colonel William J. 
Donovan. Donovan’s concept of psychological operations included several stages: the 
first being “intelligence penetration,” the next being intelligence gathering for strategic 
planning and propaganda, and the last phase being special operations such as sabotage 
and subversions, followed by unconventional guerilla tactics and actions and behind-the-
lines resistance movements.8 This, in short, defines how special operations, 
unconventional warfare, and psychological operations have been linked together from 
                                                 
6 FM 3-05.301 Psychological Operations, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures December 2003, 1-1: 
“PSYOP—are planned operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign target 
audiences (TAs) to influence their emotions, motives and objective reasoning, and ultimately, the behavior 
of foreign governments, organizations, groups, and individuals.” 
7 11 July 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt established the office of Coordinator of Information 
(COI)…the United States began its first organized venture into the fields of espionage, propaganda, 
subversion and related activities. (Paddock,1982)  
8 Alfred H. Paddock, Jr. US Army Special Warfare: Its origins. (Washington DC: National Defense 
University Press 1982), 5. 
4 
their inception.  The strategic utility of special operations is linked to the use of 
unconventional methods to produce a psychological effect on enemies, neutrals, and 
friendly forces.  Given the strategic utility of SF, the nature of UW, and the historical link 
between SF and psychological operations, an in-depth look at the underlying conditions 
of the art of influence and the development of a grassroots psychological operations 
model is relevant to Special Forces and the current environment of conflict. 
D. METHODOLOGY 
Hypothesis—The strategic utility of Special Forces lies in their ability to achieve 
strategic affects through persuasion. 
Questions:  
1) What are the elements and techniques of successful persuasion operations?  
2) What are the key elements of successful UW operations? 
3) Can SF, in a UW environment, effectively influence a target audience to achieve 
mission objectives? 
This thesis researches the elements of influence to develop a model of influence 
that can be utilized by Special Forces conducting unconventional warfare. The 
methodology is as follows: 
1) A review of the academic literature on the elements of influence and cognitive 
and social psychology.  
2) A presentation of two case studies of unconventional warfare. 
3) Development of grassroots influence model.  
Chapter II focuses on the elements of influence derived from the academic 
literature and from commercial and political applications of cognitive and social 
psychology.  The third chapter examines key elements of UW derived from the Huk 
Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. Chapter IV reviews several 
relevant models and uses them, along with the analysis of the key elements of influence 
identified in prior chapters, to develop a grassroots influence model.  Chapter V 
concludes with a summary of the research findings, recommendations for applying the 
research, and suggestions for further research in this area. 
5 
II. SURVEY OF INFLUENCE TECHNIQUES AND PRINCIPLES  
Capture their minds and their hearts and souls will follow.9 
 
This chapter surveys the research in cognitive and social psychology on techniques and 
principles for influencing human behavior.  The purpose is to establish a scientific foundation for 
exerting influence in the unconventional warfare environment by small, specially trained forces. 
The chapter is based on two assumptions.  The first is that the techniques to influence 
individual people to act can also be used to influence the masses.  The second assumption is that 
influence techniques which are effective in one environment can be successfully employed in 
distinctly different environments.  Accordingly, the chapter describes key principles, parameters 
and techniques of influence from the academic, commercial and political arenas.  The problem of 
influence is defined in the first section of the chapter.  The second section covers the principles 
and techniques of the process of influencing individuals. The third section broadens the 
discussion from a focus on the individual to an examination of social networks, social 
movements, and social epidemics.  
Analyzing the concepts and techniques of influence used in politics and the commercial 
industry is relevant to the unconventional warfare environment because they all have a common 
objective: influencing people to action.  The purposes behind this objective vary.  In the political 
arena, the purpose is winning votes; in the commercial sector, the purpose is making money.  In 
the unconventional warfare environment, the purpose is to affect the legitimacy of an existing 
government.  The ability to influence people is vital to success in all three environments.  
Whatever the purpose, some techniques and concepts transcend the differences in environments. 
This thesis asserts that in all three environments, truly effective influence campaigns start at the 
grassroots and are supported by continuous external, top-down mass media propaganda 
reinforcement. Former Speaker of the House Representatives Thomas “Tip” O’Neil famously 
said, “All politics is local.”10 Unconventional warfare is local as well.  
                                                 
9 “Psychological Operations Qoutes.” [Web site]; available from 
http://www.psywarrior.com/quotes.html; Internet; accessed 22 May 2006. 
10 Thomas O’Neill and Gary Hymel (1994). All Politics Is Local: And Other Rules of the Game. 
Holbrook MA: Bob Adams Inc. 
6 
In both the unconventional and, increasingly, conventional warfare environments, the 
process of gaining a position of influence among the indigenous population is commonly 
referred to as “winning hearts and minds.” Developing a model to effectively address the “hearts 
and minds” problem requires first defining and analyzing the problem.  
A. THE PROBLEM OF HEARTS AND MINDS  
The hearts and minds problem can be defined simply.  Because people have different 
frames of reference through which they view the world, winning indigenous people’s hearts and 
minds requires that one adjust, reshape, or mold (ARM) the perceptual framework so that the 
those indigenous views and actions are compatible with both short term tactical and long term 
strategic goals. A person’s mental frameworks—which defines someone as an individual and 
member of a community and affects how that person views the world—results from what a 
person does, which in turn is determined by where that person lives.11  A person’s frame of 
reference is shaped by experience, teaching, and observations of one’s surroundings. More 
importantly, a person’s mental framework is developed primarily by those within his circle of 
influence. Each person’s framework is slightly different. The farther a person is from the center 
of another’s circle of influence, the more likely it is that their frameworks will be shaped 
differently.  
Although people of different backgrounds and beliefs may have different frames of 
reference, there are core issues and concerns shared by all. This is demonstrated in the comments 
by Cragin and Gerwehr:  “. . . Arabs, not unlike other people all over the world, are focused 
principally on matters of security, fulfillment and satisfaction. What matters most are the things 
that affect them most directly: the quality and the security of their daily work, their faith and 
their family.”12  The issues and areas of concern that are not shared by all humans will be 
referred to as “areas of critical differences.”  These areas, no matter how subtle or distinct the 
differences may be, must be ARMed to make the hearts and minds of one group compatible with 
the goals of another group.  To effectively influence a person requires penetrating that 
individual’s circle of influence.  This is the true problem of hearts and minds and the objective of 
grassroots psychological operations.  
                                                 
11 Points in this section are drawn from discussion in Professor Anna Simons’ course on the 
Anthropology of Conflict, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005. 
12 Kim Cragin and Scott Gerwehr, Dissuading Terror: Strategic Influence in the Struggle Against 
Terrorism. (Santa Monica: RAND, 2005), 3.   
7 
B. PENETRATING THE CIRCLE OF INFLUENCE  
The circle of influence can be conceptualized as a series of concentric circles around a 
person.  Each circle represents the level of influence exerted by outside sources on the 
individual.  In “Information Wars: are the Iraqis Getting the Message?” Putman describes the 
circles of influence that most influence the Iraqi people:  the Arab satellite television channels, 
people’s family, tribe and friends, the people on the streets, Islamic clerics, and the 
newspapers.13 Putnam’s article argues that the American propaganda, used during the current 
war in Iraq, was not within the Iraqi people’s circle of influence and therefore the Iraqi people 
were not getting the American message.  
The concentric model of the circle of influence used here is based on several conditions.  
First, in order to effectively influence a person or adjust, reshape or mold that person’s frame of 
reference, you must penetrate his circle of influence; the deeper the penetration the greater the 
likelihood of effective influence. Second, the further away one is from the center of an 
individual’s circle of influence, the greater the differences in the shape of the two frameworks. 
Accordingly, it will take greater effort to ARM the framework to make it compatible with short 
and long term goals. Finally, grassroots psychological operations are intended to operate within 
the innermost circles of influence, supported by propaganda and mass media at the intermediate 
levels of the circle of influence, and public diplomacy at the outermost level of the circle of 
influence.14   
                                                 
13 Bill Putman, “Information Wars: Are the Iraqis Getting the Message?” Strategic Insights (Naval 
Postgraduate School), Vol. III, No. 12 (December 2004) [journal online]; available from 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/archiveDate.asp#vol3issue12; Internet; accessed 27 September 2005   
14 Public Diplomacy is mostly effective with countries that are like minded and not predisposed to 
perceive the initiating country as hostile or lacking credibility in its true (vs. stated)  intentions.  In short, 
the cognitive biases of a target audience prevent public diplomacy from penetrating deep into the circle of 
influence. In the cold war PD played a significant but supporting role in the influence of the Soviet Block. 
Other techniques that target the desires of the people at a grassroots level might have had a greater impact 




Figure 1.   This is a typical example of the “Circles of Influence”—some people may have a 
different order or groups in their “circles.” 
 
C. TECHNIQUES FOR INFLUENCING INDIVIDUALS  
Techniques for influencing individuals have been extensively studied and documented.  
This section describes several of the concepts most relevant for a hearts and minds mission.  
1. Six Principles of Influence 
Robert Cialdini’s six principles of influence are useful for determining how to penetrate 
the innermost circles of influence and effectively ARM an individual’s framework.  The 
principles result from the fact that humans develop automatic responses and shortcuts for dealing 
with the overwhelming, extraordinarily complicated and rapidly changing stimuli in the 
environment.  Although automatic responses may not always produce the best or most accurate 
response, they are invaluable for helping people comprehend and effectively negotiate everyday 
life. An example of a shortcut is the simple maxim often used when calculating value:  “An 
expensive price tag denotes good quality.” 15   
                                                 







Even though shortcuts and automatic responses are necessary and most of the time 
effective, they can be exploited by people who thoroughly understand the underlying principles 
of automatic responses. Cialdini categorizes these principles as six different social and 
psychological weapons of influence: reciprocation, commitment and consistency, social proof, 
liking, authority and scarcity. 
Reciprocation is based on the simple notion that “We should try to repay, in kind, what 
another person has provided us.”16  If I buy you a coke you should repay me with something 
equivalent.  This seemingly obvious and simple principle is valuable in three respects.  It has the 
power to induce repayment, it bestows a deep sense of obligation to repay an unwanted debt, and 
it can induce repayment far greater than the initial deed. Reciprocation transcends any social, 
economic, or cultural barrier.  As Gouldner notes in Influence, “There is no human society that 
does not subscribe to the rule.”17   
Commitment and consistency  involve the idea that “Once we have made a choice or 
taken a stand, we encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that 
commitment.”18  Arguably the most effective weapon of influence is the individual’s need to be 
consistent or appear consistent to others. This need creates opportunities for compliance 
professionals to influence an individual to act in ways that are not in his or her self-interest. 
Consistency is valued and respected in most circumstances and underlies the rational actor 
model.19 At a strategic level, commitment and consistency are exploited in many ways. For 
example, U.S. policy against “negotiating with terrorists” has forced the government to use back 
door negotiation or forgo opportunities to resolve hostage situations. A useful benefit of the 
commitment and consistency principle is that it produces inner change.  There is less need to 
apply pressure on individuals who have made a commitment because they have internalized 
motivations to be consistent with their commitment.  Even more telling is the fact that people 
will develop their own reasons for being consistent in their decisions, even if the initial reason 
for making the commitment is no longer present.  
                                                 
16 Cialdini, 17. 
17 Ibid, 18. 
18 Ibid, 57. 
19 The rational actor model is one of models used to explain the government decision making process 
in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New 
York: Longman, 1999). The model characterizes the government as a unitary element making decisions 
based on logic and reason with an inherent need to act consistently with previous commitments. 
10 
Social proof is based on a simple fact:  “One means we use to determine what is correct is 
to determine what other people think is correct…we view a behavior as more correct in a given 
situation to the degree that we see others performing it.”20  An example of the social proof 
principle is the Broken Window theory.21  According to the theory, if a broken window is left 
unfixed, then breaking windows becomes an acceptable behavior; if someone is observed 
breaking a window and receives no punishment, breaking windows becomes an acceptable 
behavior and the number of broken windows will continue to increase until social proof says 
“stop.” In short, if others are partaking in a given action then that action becomes socially 
acceptable. The social proof principle seems simple to implement—just get a few people to the 
altar and others will follow.  However, with this particular weapon of influence, the condition 
and timing of implementation can make a significant difference in the outcome.  Social proof is 
most effective in times of uncertainty and confusion.22  
Liking is a weapon of influence because people “prefer to say yes to the request of 
someone we know and like.”23  It is used by many of the “social salesmen” who sell products, 
such as kitchenware, in home parties.  Social salesmen thrive on social connections and 
friendships to move products. This weapon of influence may involve several different categories 
of “liking,” including physical attractiveness, similarity, and so on. Probably the most important, 
at least in the initial stages of unconventional warfare, is similarity.24 People are more likely to 
respond to others who look like them, dress like them, act like them and have similar beliefs. In 
the context of circles of influence, liking is found in the circles closest to the center.  To use 
liking as a source of influence, agents must establish some commonality, physical or mental, 
with the target audience.  
                                                 
20 Cialdini, 116. 
21 James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling, “Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Security” Manhattan Institute for Policy Research [journal online]; available from http://www.manhattan-
institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf; Internet; accessed 15 April 2006 
22 Cialdini, 129. 
23 Ibid, 167. 
24 This is most likely because first impressions are usually based on similarity. How much a stranger 
looks like, thinks like, or acts like the target audience plays a big part in getting a foot in the door.  After 
getting in the door, the stranger might establish credibility or demonstrate some sort of authority that 
changes how they are perceived.  
11 
Authority is “a deep-seated sense of duty to authority [that] is within us all.”25  A deep 
sense of duty will practically ensure obedience, regardless of the validity, importance, or 
righteousness of the task. Authority figures are seen as having greater wisdom or greater control 
over rewards and punishments. Listening to someone with more wisdom and more control only 
makes sense; it leads to automatic obedience to authority.  
In the unconventional warfare environment, it is necessary to differentiate between two 
categories of authority.  The first is righteous authority, which is defined here as authority based 
on wisdom and a sovereign right to position.  The second is power authority, which is based on 
control of resources and the ability to coerce action through their allocation as reward or 
punishment. These two types of authority often coexist and are mutually supporting. The key to 
successful influence is determining which type of authority is most important to the target 
population. If power authority is dominant, it implies the use of coercion and force to influence 
and control the people. Coercion and force require more resources and are susceptible to 
resentment and backlash. In contrast, when righteous authority is dominant, it implies a 
sovereign right to govern and the use of non-kinetic influence measures to control the people. 
Righteous authority uses fewer resources and is more likely to enlist the support of the people. In 
an unconventional warfare environment, power authority plays a significant role in gaining 
relative superiority.   For outsiders in a hostile or potentially hostile environment, power may be 
the only authority initially recognized by the indigenous people. However, it is important to 
make a transition from power authority to righteous authority as soon as possible, because power 
authority can create backlash or adversely affect the mission to win hearts and minds in support 
of tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. 
Lastly, scarcity is a weapon of influence because “opportunities seem more valuable 
when their availability is limited.”26 Scarcity is effective in influencing people because of the 
idea of loss. People are more likely to avoid loss than to take a risk to gain something, even when 
the potential loss and the potential gain are equally valuable.  Supporting this argument is 
Prospect Theory, which argues that individuals tend to be risk averse in the domain of gains and 
risk seeking in the domain of losses.27   
                                                 
25 Cialdini, 213. 
26 Ibid, 238. 
27 Rose McDermott, Risk-Taking in International Politics:  Prospect Theory in American Foreign 
Policy, (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1998), 4.   
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Part of what determines whether a situation is considered to involve “gains” or “losses” 
depends on how the options are “framed” or presented, a subject that has been addressed by 
various authors, including Anthony Pratkanis in his discussion of various techniques for 
influencing people.  
2. Four Categories of Influence Techniques 
Pratkanis presents four categories of influence techniques, including what he defines as 
“landscaping” or pre-persuasion techniques.28 In “107 Influence Techniques,” he notes that his 
influence techniques are one level below Cialdini’s six weapons of influence. This thesis does 
not require examination of all 107 techniques, but instead describes the four general categories 
which encompass those techniques.  
The four categories Pratkanis discusses are based on a communicator’s four main tasks as 
described in classical rhetoric theory:  establish a favorable climate for the influence attempt, 
create a relationship with the audience, present the message in a convincing fashion, and use the 
emotions to persuade.29  
Establishing a favorable climate for the influence attempt is also called “landscaping” or 
pre-persuasion in Pratkanis’s work.  Landscaping is defined as “Structuring the situation in such 
a way that the target is likely to be receptive to a given course of action and respond in a desired 
manner.”30 Pre-persuasion is defined as “The process of taking control of a situation to establish 
a favorable climate for influence.”31 Landscaping and pre-persuasion can play a critical part in 
determining the outcome of an influence attempt. The probability of success is directly related to 
the ability to landscape; a person with the ability to landscape effectively is most likely to 
influence the target audience.  Some of the techniques for landscaping include defining the issue 
in a favorable manner, limiting and controlling the number of choices and options, and creating a 
mutual interdependence.  
Influence is also increased if the person can create a relationship with the 
audience and “source credibility.”  Pratkanis writes, “Research has shown that what is 
important for influence is the establishment of social relationships that facilitate influence 
                                                 
28 A. R. Pratkanis, “Social influence analysis:  An Index of Tactics,” in A. R. Pratkanis, ed., The 
Science of Social Influence: Advances and Future Progress (Philadelphia: Psychology Press, forthcoming) 
29 Ibid, 5. 
30 Ibid, 5. 
31 Ibid, 6. 
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between the source and target of influence.”32 Source credibility is closely related to the 
concept of liking. This category is based on the target audience’s presumption of the 
influencer’s expertise and trustworthiness.  Techniques in this category include taking the 
role of an authority figure, expert or even the common man.  Exploiting social norms, 
utilizing the bandwagon approach and social reinforcement are other techniques to 
establish credibility.  As with the concept of social proof, the credibility of the source is 
enhanced if it appears that everyone is doing the same thing. 
The most important part of the influence process is the message, regardless of the 
techniques used to influence an individual or group. Pratkanis states, “An effective 
persuasive message is one that focuses the targets' attention and cognitive activity on 
exactly what the communicator wants them to think about.”33  The message delivers the 
intended action to be taken by the target audience. If the target audience misinterprets the 
message or does not accept it, then the intended outcome may not be achieved. A 
message that speaks to the target audience in a way to which the target audience can 
relate to is essential. There are a variety of techniques for presenting the message in a 
convincing fashion.  Importantly, to get the desired effect, it may be necessary to tailor 
the message specifically for individual people. Creating a tailored message for different 
audiences requires detailed information on each target audience. Basing the message on 
general information about a large and diverse population may result in a message that 
does not appeal to a significant portion of the target audience.   
People are also subject to influence based on emotional appeals; emotion can be 
used to persuade. According to Pratkanis, “An emotional appeal is one that uses the 
message recipient’s subjective feelings, affect, arousal, emotions, and tension-states as 
the basis for securing influence.”34 Some of the techniques that use emotion to persuade 
include appeals to fear, guilt, flattery, empathy, self-prophecy, and self-affirmation. 
Emotions are effective as an influence device because they are relatively easy to create 
and marshal in any given influence situation, and because once aroused, emotions can be 
used as a platform for promoting and securing influence and compliance. War itself can 
                                                 
32 Pratkanis, 18. 
33 Ibid, 31. 
34 Ibid, 43 
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induce and evoke a plethora of feelings that span the human emotional spectrum. 
Unconventional warfare adds the element of uncertainty to an already emotionally 
sensitive state.   
3. Overcoming Audience Immunity to Persuasion 
The Persuaders is a documentary produced by PBS that investigates what 
correspondent Douglas Rushkoff calls the “persuasion industry.”35 The persuasion 
industry consists of commercial advertising agencies, politicians, social psychologists, 
and anyone involved in the process selling a product, service, candidate or an idea. The 
documentary provides a few specified and implied techniques of persuasion that might 
prove helpful for understanding psychological operations in an unconventional warfare 
environment.  
According to The Persuaders, the persuasion industry today must deal head-on 
with the problem of clutter. Clutter refers to people getting so bombarded with 
advertising and solicitations that they become immune to the messages.  Naomi Klein 
suggests that “consumers are like roaches. You spray them and spray them and after a 
while, it doesn’t work anymore. We develop immunities.”36 With clutter (and the 
consequent immunity) defined as the primary problem of the persuasion industry, the 
documentary investigates ways to break through the clutter, just as this thesis investigates 
ways to penetrate the circle of influence.  
Information is the key to overcoming the immunity of a target audience, as the 
documentary notes.  The need for information in commercial markets has direct 
application to the need for information in the unconventional warfare environment. 
Market research in the commercial sector is the functional equivalent to intelligence 
gathering in the military context. Most important is the need for the right information, 
information gathered on the target audience. Not once did The Persuaders documentary 
show an advertising specialist, psychologist, or influence agent allude to gathering 
information on the competitors; they focused instead on how millions of dollars are spent 
                                                 
35 Barak Goodman and Douglas Rushkoff, transcript of the documentary The Persuaders (2005), 
Frontline PBS. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/persuaders/etc/script.html Accessed 15 
February 2006. 
36 Ibid, 1. 
15 
to gather information on the target audience. Commercial firms defeat their competitors 
indirectly, by winning the hearts and minds of consumers.  
Advertising expert David Atkins suggests that people join cults and choose brand-
name products for the same reason. “They need to belong and they want [their lives to 
have a greater purpose] to make meaning. We need to figure out what the world is all 
about, and we need the company of others.”37  Clotaire Rapaille, a market research 
specialist, believes that people’s explanations of their own behavior are merely 
rationalizations created to make sense of behavior that is motivated by unconscious needs 
and impulses. Rapaille emphasizes that each individual has a simple code, a reptilian hot 
button, which determines their decisions.38 Understanding the different codes is essential 
if one wants to push the reptilian hot button. 
Market researcher Frank Luntz believes that “it doesn’t matter what you want to 
tell the public, it’s about what they want to hear.”39 His technique is to take an issue and 
figure out what words would make that issue appealing to the target audience.   The 
Persuaders notes that “Luntz’s specialty is testing language, finding words that work.”40 
He believes that it is more important to understand an individual’s feeling than it is to 
understand what they are thinking, as “Eighty percent of life is emotion and only twenty 
percent is intellect.”41 
In the information gathering process, after the codes and the words that evoke 
emotions and feeling have been identified and determined, it is time to develop profiles 
for the target audience. Target audience profiles help determine the type and number of 
messages needed to move different parts of the target audience to the same collective 
action.  
The answer to overcoming immunity is the tailored message, according to The 
Persuaders.  For example, in the political arena the old idea of reaching voters one-on-
one has reemerged as “narrow casting.” Politicians understand that they must appeal to 
several different demographics and that messages that appeal to one group of people that 
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may not appeal to another.  It is inevitable that a politician’s constituents will have 
different frames of reference and varying views.   
The Persuaders proposes that understanding the problem of clutter, the key 
importance of emotion and wording, and the tailored message and an answer to the 
problem moves everyone a step closer to understanding the art of persuasion. As Stuart 
Ewen suggests, “The secret of it all, the secret of all persuasion, is to induce the person to 
persuade himself.”42  
In summary, when considering the research on techniques for influencing 
individuals,   the concepts of landscaping, liking, and message fit are among the 
reoccurring themes. The literature shows the individualistic nature of influence and the 
need to tailor the influence attempt to the target.  Social networks and organizations and 
networks also play a role in the influence process; the literature on that subject is 
reviewed below.   
D. FROM INDIVIDUALS TO SOCIAL EPIDEMICS: THE INFLUENCE OF 
SOCIAL NETWORKS AND KEY INDIVIDUALS  
Much research on the importance of key individuals and social networks focuses 
on the political arena.  
1. Social Networks and Political Choices  
In “It’s the Conversation Stupid: The Link between Social Interaction and 
Political Choice,” Krebs argues for a more “social” image of choice, and especially 
political choice.43  He suggests that a voter is not influenced only by information and 
opinions received directly from the media (the atomized voter).  Nor is it accurate to rely 
on the idea of a particular demographic group as the main influence or predictor of a 
voter’s choice (the demographic voter).  Rather, Krebs says, voters are social (the social 
voter), and social networks exert a powerful influence on voting behavior. “Modern 
citizens do not make decisions in a social vacuum. Who we know influences what we 
know and how we feel about it.”44  
                                                 
42 Goodman, Barak and Douglas Rushkoff, transcript of the documentary The Persuaders (2005), 
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The research conducted by Krebs alludes to how to effectively influence the 
masses. Trends in groups often start with one person taking a stand.  Krebs’s research 
demonstrates that in an election, a single person can influence as many as four others to 
turn out, creating a cascade effect on behalf of the initiator’s candidate. As in the political 
realm, cascades and numbers are important in unconventional warfare.  To the extent that 
more people support one side, there are fewer to support the other side. It is important to 
note that if the event that initiated the cascade began within a group that did not agree 
with the initiator, the cascade might favor the opposing candidate.  In other words, a 
cascade may go in an unintended direction.  
People more readily use information received from their networks.  Krebs found 
the strongest influence from family, with additional influence exerted by neighbors and 
casual acquaintances (but no apparent influence by strangers on citizen choice in political 
matters).45   Although groups influence the behavior of their members, key opinion 
leaders and experts, as well as those with connections to them, also hold the power to 
persuade, and this subject will be examined in depth later in this chapter.  
Based on recent presidential campaign research, Krebs proposes five rules which 
here are given simple names so they can more easily be referred to later in this thesis.46  
Rule 1.  Take a stand and announce your plans.  One can increase voter 
participation by announcing plans to vote. One must do this in a community that is 
predisposed to your candidate.  
Rule 2.  Neutral battleground.  Find communities that do not have a majority for 
the other candidate. Build connections to undecided voters and those who support your 
view. Aim for one or more ties to all supporting your candidate.   
Rule 3.  Scan enemy territory for dissenters.  Scan communities that have a 
majority for the other candidate in search of anyone supporting your candidate. Build at 
least one supporting tie to each person leaning towards your candidate.   
Rule 4.  Utilize your local reputation.  If you are well integrated in your 
neighborhood and known for providing useful advice to neighbors, then consider talking 
to them about your candidate.  
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Rule 5.  Use the likeness and inner circle concepts.  Unless they are public 
figures, strangers do not influence. Instead of having strangers call voters, or knock on 
doors, the campaign should find well-connected supporters and have them go out into 
their clusters (workplaces, places of worship, neighborhoods, sports leagues, etc.) 
building support for the candidate. Bringing masses of campaign workers who are 
strangers to contact local voters may cause more harm then good.  
Krebs’ rules may be useful in the UW environment in determining what areas to 
target first, as well as the types of individuals to look for in those areas.  
2. Social Networks and Social Movements 
In “Beyond Structural Analysis: Toward a More Dynamic Understanding of 
Social Movements”47 Doug McAdam presents three common structural facts that 
influence the relationship between networks and social movements and elaborates on 
them in a way useful to those hoping to use the literature in an unconventional warfare 
setting.   
The first common structural fact, simply stated, is that recruits to a social 
movement know others already involved. By providing prospective recruits with a mix of 
information and incentives, prior social ties encourage entrance into a movement.  The 
second fact is that most social movements develop within an established setting, which 
provides insurgents with the resources to start and sustain collective action. The third fact 
is that emerging movements tend to spread along established lines of interaction, because 
information, rendered credible by prior contact with the innovator, mediates the spread of 
a movement.48 These facts are valuable information for an unconventional warfare 
environment, but McAdam’s analysis provides a deeper understanding of the actual 
mechanism at work behind each fact.  
 The first fact is that recruits to a social movement tend to know others who are 
already involved.  McAdams analysis focuses on the process of individual recruitment, 
which involves four conditions:  the occurrence of a specific recruiting attempt, 
successful linkage of the movement and the recruit’s sense of identity, support for that 
linkage from others who normally sustain the recruit’s identity, and absence of strong 
                                                 
47 Doug McAdam, “Beyond Structural Analysis,” in Social Movements and Networks: Relational 
Approaches to Collective Action (Oxford New York: Oxford University Press 2003), 281-298.  
48 Ibid, 285. 
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opposition from others on whom the recruit’s other salient identities depend (see Figure 
2. below).  In other words, a seemingly simple fact turns out to have important and 
contingent elements that could be manipulated by skilled operators in an unconventional 
warfare environment.  
For example, a specific recruiting attempt may seem to be an obvious first step, but it 
is important to note that rarely do individuals approach a movement on their own accord. 
The   linkage of movement and identity is important because once a person makes a 
commitment to who he wants to be—his identity—he will act consistent with that 
commitment.  A person’s identity is closely tied to those he knows, so support for the 
recruit’s new identity works because individuals want their identity to reflect the identity 
of those they socialize with. People want approval and support from their social networks 
and if their social networks are involved in a social movement, they will join to maintain 
consistency with the group. The last aspect of the individual recruitment process is the 
absence of strong opposition from others who might affect an individual’s sense of 
identity. In an unconventional warfare environment, there will naturally be strong 
opposition to the position or message being promoted by the opposition force/ insurgent 
group. The key is to recognize and isolate the target individual from opposing views. 
Recognizing the impact of opposition views on recruitment allows the recruiting group to 
prepare a counter in their own defense.  McAdam suggests that the first three 
mechanisms may individually be effective recruitment tools but if done sequentially, and 




Figure 2.   The Process of Individual Recruitment— Doug McAdam 49 
 
 
Similarly, McAdam’s analysis of the second fact, most social movements develop 
in an established setting, can be summarized by one succinct observation: “Bottom line: it 
is not prior ties or group structures that enable protest, but rather the interactive 
conversations that occur there and succeed in creating shared meanings and identities that 
legitimate emergent collective action.”50 The results of McAdam’s analysis of the second 
structural fact focuses on the process of “emergent mobilization,” a three-stage process 
involving stages he labels attribution of threat or opportunity, social appropriation, and 
innovative contentious actions.  Attribution of threat or opportunity is a “group level 
account of some new threat to, or opportunity for, the realization of group interests.” In 
other words, a group will mobilize for action when it is newly threatened or there is a 
new opportunity for gain. If the threat or opportunity is not new, the group has already 
adapted to the situation. As noted in the discussion of Prospect Theory, individuals tend 
to be risk averse for gains and risk seeking to avoid losses. Framing a situation as a threat 
to the group will mobilize them better than framing the situation as an opportunity. Social 
appropriation is the process by which an insurgent group takes over an existing 
organization and its collective identity; without an existing organization to appropriate, 
insurgents must create a new organization with a collective identity to supports the 
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movement’s objectives. Finally, the concept of innovative contentious action is that once 
a movement has been mobilized, it must act in a contentious way to demonstrate a 
departure from normal behavior, to signal its change in identity and also to impose on the 
mobilized group the pressures of two weapons of influence, commitment and 
consistency.  (See Figure 3) 
 
 
Figure 3.   The Process of Emergent Mobilization—Doug McAdam51 
 
 Finally, consider the third fact, that emerging movements tend to spread along 
established lines of interaction.  McAdam says, “The vast majority of contentious 
episodes never spread beyond the local settings in which they first develop.”52  His 
analysis of this fact involves the concept of “scale shift,” defined as “a change in the 
number and level of coordinated contentious action leading to broader contention 
involving a wider range of actors and bridging the claims of their identities.”53 Simply 
stated, more groups can relate with the identity of the initiating organization and 
coordinate their actions. Scale shift is a process that involves five stages:  localized 
action, brokerage or diffusion, attribution of similarity, emulation, and coordinated 
action. 
The process of scale shift begins only if there is localized action, a spark that sets 
things in motion. Localized action serves as a model for others. The next stage is 
brokerage and diffusion. Brokerage is like a salesman providing information or selling 
the idea of a localized action to someone previously unknown, while diffusion is akin to 
word of mouth where information is passed through already established ties.  In the third 
stage, the attribution of similarity, actors in different sites identify themselves as being 
sufficiently similar as to justify common action. Regardless of location, if a person can 
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relate to another person’s identity, it increases the likelihood of common action. Once the 
similarities have been established, the distant group will begin to emulate the group 
whose localized action initially sparked others’ interest. The process is followed by 
coordinated action, as shown in Figure 4.   
 
 
Figure 4.   The Process of Scale Shift—Doug McAdam54  
 
McAdam’s analysis provides more in-depth understanding of social networks and 
social movements, which can aid in adapting to ever changing and unpredictable 
environments.  
3. Social Epidemics:  Key People, Memorable Messages, and the 
Importance of Context  
In an unconventional warfare environment it is not enough to simply induce 
localized action. The intent is to have the localized action supporting our objectives 
become contagious and spread across the entire operations area. It is the insurgent’s 
intent to do the same.  McAdams demonstrates that the process of scale shift spreads 
social action. This process can be elaborated in the context of social epidemics. In a 
                                                 











popular book by the same name, journalist Malcolm Gladwell55 defines a “tipping point” 
as a moment of critical mass, a threshold, or a boiling point, but most importantly for this 
thesis, as the point when localized action bursts onto the large scale stage.56 For the 
military, the tipping point might be associated with the decisive point in a battle when, 
before the end of the fighting, the battle was actually won or lost.  
In an attempt to understand the mysteries of everyday changes, Gladwell 
summarizes studies of these events in the context of epidemics.  He argues that every 
epidemic has a tipping point. Gladwell suggests that the research points to three rules of 
social epidemics which help frame the process of scale shift from a slightly different view 
point.57    
The first rule, according to Gladwell, is the law of the few, which simply states 
that most of the work in epidemics is done by a small percentage of people. More 
importantly, it is the type of people who do the work that makes the difference in the 
spread of the epidemic. “Any kind of social epidemic is heavily dependent on the 
involvement of people with a particular and rare set of social gifts,”58 Gladwell argues, 
labeling these people as connectors, mavens, and salesmen. The ideal situation would be 
to find a person who posses characteristics of all three. Connectors have the special gift 
of bringing people together. Connectors socialize with a very diverse group and function 
well in any given setting. A connector has the ability to cross-fertilize groups with 
different perspectives. Mavens have the gift of information and are respected authority 
figures in their social networks. Those with persuasive skills Gladwell calls salesmen.  
They understand the subtle nuisances involved with communication, can read and use 
body language, and understand the effects of emotion on individual decision making. 
Unlike connectors and mavens, there is science behind the salesman’s gift.  Salesmen 
also rely heavily on their message, which is the essence of the second rule of social 
epidemics:  the stickiness factor.   
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The stickiness factor refers to how memorable the message is to the target 
audience and if it is memorable enough to move people to act. Gladwell argues that the 
stickiness factor of a message can be increased with simple and subtle yet significant 
changes. By paying “careful attention to the structure and format of your material, you 
can dramatically enhance the stickiness.”59  As discussed earlier in this chapter, tailoring 
the message to the audience is an important factor in determining the outcome of an 
influence attempt.  
According to Gladwell, the power of context means that “we are more than just 
sensitive to changes in context. We are exquisitely sensitive to them.”60 In short, the 
environment affects the way we act.  In this view, the power of context and the broken 
window theory are one and the same. “They are both based on the premise that an 
epidemic can be reversed, can be tipped, by tinkering with the smallest details of the 
immediate environment.”61  
Gladwell’s three rules of epidemics suggest three main lessons. The first lesson is 
that a small group of people with certain skills can cause major changes. Second, a well 
crafted message is memorable and moves people to action. Finally, manipulating the 
situation or making small changes in the environment can dramatically affect the way 
people behave.  
E. CONCLUSION 
The techniques and principles of influence discussed in this chapter will prove 
useful in the development of the grassroots PSYOP model. Both techniques of 
influencing individuals and the dynamics of social networks and epidemics will be 
apparent in the two case studies presented in the next chapter. An analysis of the Huk 
Rebellion in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency will provide influence 
techniques and principles particular to the UW environment.  
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III. TWO CASE STUDIES OF INFLUENCE: THE PHILIPPINES 
1946–1954 AND THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948–1960  
Public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail. 
Without it nothing can succeed. He who molds opinion is greater than he 
who enacts laws. President Abraham Lincoln 
 
The elements of influence are an integral part of unconventional warfare. 
Depending on the situation, kinetic or non-kinetic means may be used to influence the 
target audience. But regardless of the situation, certain elements of influence have 
emerged in unconventional warfare.  The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key 
elements of influence. These elements form the basis of an influence model focused on 
non-kinetic means of influence. This chapter presents two cases in which influence 
principles and techniques were used by both the insurgent group and the counter-
insurgent force. The general conditions of each case study are briefly described, followed 
by particular influence lessons from the case. The two case studies are the Huk rebellion 
in the Philippines and the Malayan Emergency. 
A. THE PHILIPPINES 1946–1954 
The Huk rebellion can be categorized as a peasant revolt of an agrarian nature 
with origins in “a collection of vaguely Marxist labor groups, peasant organizations, and 
other groups which sought to unite against Japanese aggression in the weeks immediately 
preceding the attack on the Philippine Islands by Japanese troops.”62 During Japanese 
occupation, the Peoples Army against the Japanese (the Huknong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon 
or Hukbalahap, known as the Huks) became the largest and most powerful resistance 
group on Luzon.  After the liberation of the Philippines by American forces, the Huks 
continued to pursue their political agenda of land reform.  
The underlying condition of the Philippine insurrection was land reform, “land for 
the landless.” The agrarian issues of the peasants were directly related to the class 
division in Philippine society.  The upper class enjoyed privileges and rewards that were  
 
                                                 
62 L. E. Cable, Conflict of Myths: The Development of American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and the 
Vietnam War (New York: New York University Press, 1986) 45. 
26 
not equally distributed to the peasants or workers. This system of class division did not 
reward hard work and more importantly did not provide opportunities for the majority of 
the youth.  
The class division can be described as the land owners (landed aristocrats) versus 
the share tenants. The situation for the tenant was just one step above slavery.  Although 
the standard agreement between the land owners and the tenants was a fifty-fifty division 
of the crops, in reality the tenant was irreversibly indebted to the land owner. The 
inequality in privileges and opportunities inevitably led to social unrest; all that was 
needed was a mechanism to coordinate a social movement or insurrection. Ultimately the 
Huks’ organization, discipline, and their well-conceived plan—features that were clearly 
demonstrated and communicated—appealed more to the people than did the corrupt 
government.  
The agents to coordinate the social movement came in two forms, communism 
and socialism, each of which promoted a system to remove both the class system and 
capitalism and create social equality.  Agrarian unrest was common in Philippine history 
and the conditions for an insurrection were in place. Mobilization had begun prior to the 
Japanese occupation and the Philippine government was fully aware of the agrarian 
unrest. All that was needed was the key leadership to organize the movement. However, 
agrarian issues took a back seat to resisting the Japanese forces during the occupation.  
The Huk leadership played a crucial part in the formation, rise, and fall of the 
agrarian insurrection. The leaders came from all walks of life, including labor leaders, 
well-educated men with poor backgrounds, and some of the top intellectuals in the 
country. Local leaders were responsible for knitting together local peasant groups and 
associations into larger and stronger peasant organizations. These local leaders were often 
the first to protest publicly against agrarian conditions and acted as the voices of the local 
peasants. The local leaders also shouldered the responsibilities of organizing collective 






without the benefit of mass media and mass public access to communication 
technologies, local leaders acted as links between groups and organizations in physically 
distant locations.63  
One of the first advocates for the peasants and agrarian reform was Pedro Abad 
Santos. Santos was born to a well-to-do family; he was educated as a lawyer and became 
a skilled attorney. He first took up the peasants’ interests after continual exposure to the 
aristocrats’ injustices towards the peasants and workers. He began to provide legal 
council to peasant organizations and labor unions, which led to his involvement in the 
agrarian movement.64 Another key insurrection leader was Luis Taruc, who became 
known as “El Supremo.”  Unlike Santos, Taruc was born to a poor family; however, he 
was educated and even received two years of pre-law training prior to becoming the 
Huks’ leader and spokesman. He was popular with the peasants and led the insurrection 
until he surrendered in 1954.65 Also critically important to the movement was Jose Lava, 
a graduate of the University of the Philippines and from a well-to-do family.  Lava, also a 
lawyer, was thoroughly immersed in the teachings of Marxist Leninism. He was regarded 
as the intellectual leader of the Huks and was responsible for most of the education and 
training of the recruits, as well as developing Huk propaganda.66 Although there were 
many other leaders and significant individuals in the Huk organization, the three 
mentioned here were most instrumental in the creation of the Huks and the rise and fall of 
the insurrection.  
The original Huk organization was the wartime product of the merger of the 
Communist Peasant Union and the Socialist Peasant Union. Two core ideas linked the 
two organizations together:  better conditions and pay for peasants and workers along 
with key concepts within socialism and communism, such as class struggle. The Social 
Peasants Union (AMT) was organized by Santos and Taruc prior to the establishment of 
the Communist Peasant Union (KPMP). The AMT began as a labor union attempting to 
secure better conditions and more pay for peasant workers. The AMT was believed to be 
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the more aggressive of the two organizations, actively promoting class war.  Crisanto 
Evagelista was a key leader in the KPMP, which was believed to be concerned more with 
the international aspects and proliferation of communism from Russia than with the 
concerns of local peasants and workers.67 As a result, the communist party found most of 
its supporters amongst the bourgeoisie and alienated the majority of urban labor. So it 
was in the best interest of both organizations, and especially the KPMP, to merge and 
join forces in the agrarian revolt. 
The Huks used a variety of tactics and techniques to recruit, gain support of the 
people, and grow the movement. In the face of an incompetent government response to 
the growing strength of the Huks, they garnered a significant amount of active and 
passive popular support. The Huks’ main mantra—“land for the landless”—was one that 
all peasants and workers could relate to; it directly tied into the government’s seeming 
lack of concern for the working class. However, “No single motive, not even the agrarian 
issue, accounts more than a small minority of those who joined the Huks.”68 A more 
likely explanation for the Huks’ successful recruitment is the amount of control and 
authority that the Huks exerted over the barrios. Having control over the barrios and 
exercising authority judiciously within the barrios gave the Huks access to the people 
they were trying to influence.   
In order to gain control of an area, the Huks would use open forum events to get 
their message out, while at the same time de-legitimizing the local and national 
governments.  Even when the government began to refuse the Huks permits to host 
public events and rallies, the Huks found a way to “hijack” local government-sponsored 
events, by publicly asking the host questions revolving around the conditions of peasants 
and workers and then providing their own answers before the host had an opportunity to 
respond. These hijacking tactics proved very useful in getting the message to the people 
in a manner that embarrassed unprepared local officials.69   
                                                 
67 Eduardo Lachica, The Huks: Philippine Agrarian Society Revolt (New York: Praeger 
Publishers,1971) 100 Alfredo Saulo, former Education Department Chief, analysis of the Huk organization. 
68 Alvin H. Schaff The Philippine Answer to Communism. (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press 
1955)118. 
69 Ibid, 19. 
29 
In the barrios, the Huks established themselves as the legitimate authority by 
protecting the people, collecting taxes, adjudicating offenses, and establishing schools 
and educational systems. If local government officials would not cooperate, at times the 
Huks would brand the officials as perpetrators of offenses against the people and would 
murder the officials in the name of justice.  These actions lent the Huks the appearance of 
liberators. Once control was gained and authority established, the Huks co-opted local 
organizations and associations and used them to reinforce and spread the Huk message. 
The Huk resistance “secretly converted neighborhood associations into BUDC [Barrio 
United Defense Corps].”70 A Huk party leader resided within these organizations and his 
job was to mold, shape and maneuver conversations so that they always ended up 
following the party line. The party members themselves were organized into groups of 
three to five people. These small cells created intensely loyal and self-abnegating 
individuals by making each party member bare his own weaknesses through self-
criticism and point out flaws in other members.  
The Huks had to rely on a variety of recruitment techniques to bolster their active 
rebel forces. Even with a message such as “land for the landless” and a movement based 
on the betterment of life for the peasants and workers, few people (about 11 percent71) 
sought to join the Huks or to provide active support to the rebels. The majority joined not 
out of concern for land reform issues.  Rather, they joined to escape persecution by the 
government or because they had a grievance with the government over military back pay. 
The Huk recruitment concept was simple, with two phases. The first phase was contact 
by force, by accident, or by friendly association. The second phase was intellectual assent 
and indoctrination. The most powerful recruitment tool for the Huks, and the one that 
provided 38 percent of their recruits, was personal relationships. As with most societies, 
personal relationships account for most of what people do and how they act. The 
obligation to personal relationships in Philippine society was so strong that people would 
join the Huks simply because a relative or friend had become a Huk.72   
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Others were “invited” to join by armed strangers who did not always use force 
with new recruits but might use more subtle means, such as the foot in the door 
technique. One former Huk recalls that his recruitment began with a request to help the 
Huks carry a bag of rice into the woods. After helping the Huks carry the rice, the recruit 
was assimilated into the group and never returned to his barrio again. Twenty percent of 
the Huks were recruited in a similar manner.  However, the Huks at times resorted to 
straight kidnapping or capture of recruits. It is estimated that 18 percent of the Huk 
soldiers or supporters were kidnapped.73  
The education phase was very important in instilling the core ideas of the 
movement into the Huks new members and supporters. For some peasants, the education 
phase of recruitment was the first time they were exposed to the ideas of land for the 
landless or to communist propaganda. For these recruits it was not until after they had 
committed to the Huks that they learned the core concepts and became true believers in 
the Huk’s three core ideas: “land for the landless,” equalization of the class structure, and 
sympathy for the oppressed.74  
Educating the masses on the core ideas of the Huk cause was of utmost 
importance. All propaganda centered on these three ideas that related directly to the 
masses of workers and peasants. Huk propaganda also targeted local and national 
governmental leadership, exposing the government’s lack of concern for the common 
people and the injustices that the government and upper classes perpetrated against the 
peasants and the working class. Huk propaganda also targeted government programs that 
had been developed to counter the Huk claims of inequality, such as the Economic 
Development Corps (EDCOR) farms, which were farm lands given to Huk soldiers who 
surrendered. The Huk counterpropaganda to the establishment of the EDCOR farms was 
to claim that they were concentration camps.75  
The various government responses and strategies for combating the Huks can be 
categorized by different presidential administrations prior to and during the Huk 
rebellion.  At the beginning of the insurrection, prior to the Japanese occupation, 
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President Manuel Quezon recognized the peasants’ social unrest. However, Quezon paid 
the unrest little attention. The Quezon administration passed a handful of laws in the late 
1930’s addressing the differences between the land owners and the peasants.  These laws, 
and a few small concessions that came under the title of the “Social Justice” program, 
were not intended to fix the situation but to pacify the masses. The Quezon 
administration also dabbled in the use of force to quell social unrest but, as with the 
“Social Justice” initiatives, the use of force failed to stem the unrest of the peasants and 
working class. Before the unrest became a full-blown peasant rebellion, the Japanese 
invaded and the Huks attention turned to thwarting the Japanese occupation of the 
Philippines.76 
After the liberation of the Philippines in 1945, the first president of the Philippine 
Republic was President Manuel Roxas. The Huks resentment of the government 
continued to grow because they were treated as outlaws rather than as forces who had 
contributed significantly to the liberation of the Philippines. Furthermore, Roxas and 
many in his administration had held offices under the Japanese during the occupation. 
The Huks quickly turned this into to an anti-government propaganda issue, labeling the 
Roxas administration as traitors and collaborators. In response, Roxas proclaimed his 
“iron fist” policy.  He insisted that he would wipe out the Huks in sixty days, and would 
accept only an unconditional surrender or annihilation of the Huk forces. A problem with 
Roxas’ plan was that he was sent poorly trained, underpaid and hard-pressed government 
troops to eradicate a seasoned Huk guerrilla force that enjoyed the support and sympathy 
of the local populace. The government troops engaged in indiscriminate use of force, 
shelling barrios, mistreating the local populace, and purging the communities of supplies.  
This approach naturally strengthened local support for the Huks. The aggressive iron fist 
program, along with the government troops’ poor performance and behavior, validated 
the Huk rhetoric about the government’s lack of concern for peasants and the working 
class.77 
Initially, President Elpidio Quirino’s administration sought to reverse the stern 
military policy of his predecessor.  Instead of a policy of unconditional surrender or 
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annihilation, Quirino sought to bring the Huks “into the government’s fold through 
conciliation and sweet reasonableness.”78 The Quirino administration began negotiations 
with the Huks and offered Taruc, the Huk Supremo, the seat in congress that he had been 
denied in the previous election. The administration also established an amnesty period in 
which all Huks could register and turn in their weapons. However, after a few weeks of 
negotiations in which both sides charged the other with acting in bad faith, Taruc 
disappeared back into Huk controlled territory and the fighting resumed. With the failure 
of Roxas’ iron fist policy and now Quirino’s “velvet glove” policy, many began to doubt 
an end to the Huk rebellion.  
The most significant event of the Quirino administration was the appointment of 
Ramon Magsaysay as the Secretary of the Department of National Defense (DND). At 
the time of his appointment, Magsaysay was a newcomer in the political arena. However, 
with his background as a commander of guerilla forces against the Japanese, Magsaysay 
understood the fundamentals of insurgency. After the failure of the iron fist and velvet 
glove policies, he and the rest of the Philippine government recognized that in the fight 
against the Huk rebels, the most important goal of government policy was to regain the 
trust of the peasant and working class. He instituted the “policy of attraction” that not 
only advocated dealing with the Huks justly and humanely, but also ensured proper 
behavior by the troops as they interacted with the local populace.  
 Magsaysay also understood the intelligence potential of the local populace in 
regards to gathering information on the Huks. Under Magsaysay’s direction, the military 
still maintained an aggressive posture towards Huk forces; however, they were more 
judicious in the use of force and avoided useless bloodshed of Huk members and 
supporters.  In so doing, the government forces increased their popularity among the 
people.  As government forces stopped committing abuses on villagers, the villagers 
began to trust the forces more.  They began to provide information to the military and 
were less willing to give information to the Huks. Mao Tse-tung specifically addressed 
this concept of good behavior in his list of three rules and eight remarks for guerilla 
interaction with the population: all actions are subject to command, do not steal from 
people, be neither selfish nor unjust; replace the door when you leave the house, roll up 
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your bedding on which you have slept, be courteous, be honest in your transactions, 
return what you borrow, replace what you break, do not bathe in the presence of women, 
do not with out authority search the pocketbooks of those you arrest. 79  
 The importance of the individual soldier’s behavior on the population is captured 
in a psychological operations case study of the Huk rebellion by Valerriano and 
Bohannan.80 In discussing what Magsaysay “knew” about counterinsurgency, among the 
key elements was that in the operational area, the soldier is by far the most significant 
element of government contact with civilians, and every action of the soldier reflects on 
the government.81 The core concepts of the government’s attraction program were a 
robust psychological warfare campaign supported by effective reform measures designed 
to address social problems in conjunction with continued military pressure on the active 
guerrilla forces. The main theme of the psychological warfare (PSYOPS) campaign was 
to win back the trust of the people. Accordingly, the target audience for PSYOPS was as 
much the government forces as it was the local populace. Programs that undercut Huk 
propaganda by directly addressing the major issues of peasants and workers included the 
EDCOR farm land distribution, which provided land for the landless, and the Rice Share 
Tenancy Act, which provided a venue to settle tenant complaints through the Industrial 
Relations Courts. 
The Huk rebellion began to lose the support of the people in 1951 because of their 
atrocities against the government and the people as well. The defining moment in the fall 
of the insurrection came in 1954, when Taruc surrendered to government forces. Shortly 
after his surrender, the Army launched vigorous and sustained drives to capture the 
remaining dissidents and succeeded in capturing many of Taruc’s elite guard and trusted 
followers. The success of the government campaign against the Huks can be attributed to 
the simultaneous attack on the Huks on many fronts.  For example, the psychological 
operations and land reform were important factors in ending the Huk rebellion. “Effective  
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counter guerilla action…so intermingles concrete useful actions, protective actions, and 
psychological operations that it is difficult to tell where one action leaves off and another 
begins.”82   
An influence lesson from the Huk rebellion is the need to know and understand 
the issues of the people so that those issues can be effectively addressed. For the 
government, the first major turning point in the rebellion was the government’s 
recognition of the Huks’ underlying theme that had created them and led to their popular 
support:  land reform. With this recognition, the government could take steps towards 
remedying the land reform issues, thus undermining the Huks’ main rallying cry to the 
people.  
Furthermore, the need to network different organizations into one larger and 
stronger organization was present in the Huk rebellion prior to the Japanese occupation. 
“[Huk] top leaders helped to knit together local peasant groups and associations into 
larger and stronger peasant organizations.”83 The same sentiment is expressed in the 
following statement about the resistance movement during the Japanese occupations. 
The resistance movement that sprang up in Central Luzon was unique 
among those that fought back . . . the decisive element of difference lay in 
the strong peasant unions and organization of the people that existed 
before the war. It gave the movement a mass base, and made the armed 
forces indistinguishable from the people.84  
The discipline of government forces in dealing with the population is also a key 
lesson from the Huk rebellion. As the government forces stopped committing abuses of 
villagers, the villagers began to trust the forces more and to provide information to the 
military; they became less willing to give information to the Huks.  
 In summary, the main lessons from the Huk rebellion are:  
1) The first step is to get acquainted with the people in the sector 
2) A soldier has three missions: operations, intelligence and psy-war, and public 
relations (the three-in-one plan)  
3) Rebels recruit from social ties 
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4) Understand and address the insurgents’ main theme 
5) Have proper management and control of local organizations and networks  
 
B. THE MALAYAN EMERGENCY 1948–1960  
The so-called “Malayan Emergency” has been lauded by many as the model for 
conducting counter-insurgency, primarily because of the success of the British 
government in defeating the communist insurgency. However, as R.W. Kommer 
suggests, the United Kingdom and the government of Malaya made many mistakes 
before developing “an almost classic ‘long haul low cost’ strategy well adapted to the 
problem they confronted.”85   The fact that the counterinsurgency approach was a “mixed 
strategy encompassing civil, police, military, and psychological warfare programs” was 
crucial to the governments’ success.  
As with the Huk rebellion, the Malayan Emergency had its roots in opposition to 
the Japanese during World War II. The Malayan Communist Party (MCP) sought to 
expedite the British withdrawal from Malaya in hopes of strengthening its position with 
the Chinese community.  
 The true underlying condition of the Malayan emergency was the spread of 
communism in Asia. The three main issues that the MCP used to rally support were 
discrimination against the Malayan immigrant races and primarily the ethnic Chinese, 
land reform, and independence from British colonial rule. However, the last issue, 
Malayan independence, had already been declared by the British after Malaya was 
liberated from Japanese occupation.  Therefore, for the MCP to start a rebellion claiming 
that independence from British rule was their primary goal would have been 
counterproductive. Therefore, it can be argued that the underlying and true condition for 
the insurgency was primarily the spread of communism and issues within the communist 
party.86 
Lacking a truly universal reason for revolt, the support for the MCP was limited 
to the Chinese minority who were mainly squatters living on the plantations at the edge  
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of the jungles. The early success of the MCP can be attributed to three key factors: the 
jungle terrain, support from the squatters, and the weakness of the early government 
response.  
 The leadership and key players within the MCP were able to devise a sound 
strategy and propaganda campaign for the insurgency. The group was led by General 
Secretary Chin Peng, a Malaysian-Chinese who spoke six languages. He joined the 
communist party at age eighteen. He had fought along side the British guerilla forces, 
Force 136, against the Japanese. His commander regarded Chin Peng as Britain’s most 
trusted guerilla—a testament not only to his skill as a fighter but also to his character and 
intelligence. As party leader, he devised the core strategy for the insurgency. His 
significant contributions to the party came from the fact that he was well versed in the 
political aspects of insurgencies and Mao’s teachings on peoples’ uprisings.87   
Lam Swee was the political commissar of the MCP, vice-president of the Pan-
Malayan Federation of Trade Unions, and a member of the South Johore Regional 
Committee of the MCP. Swee became disgruntled with the way the movement was being 
led. For example, he was astonished to learn that MCP central committee members were 
living far better than others in the party.  He was very outspoken about the conduct of the 
emergency and began to feel that his life was in danger from within the party.  He 
surrendered to Malayan officials, probably the most significant surrender of the 
Emergency. He immediately began to work for the government and wrote “My 
Accusation,”88 which was used as propaganda by the government.  
Another important figure in the MCP, Osman China, also eventually surrendered 
and began working for the government. China ran several newspapers from deep in the 
jungle; he surrendered primarily due to the harsh conditions of jungle life. Because he 
knew many of the jungle news routes, he was instrumental in the execution of the 
“surrender by mail campaign.”89 
 On the government side, Sir Edward Gent was the High Commissioner at the 
beginning of the emergency. Gent was credited with disregarding warnings of a 
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communist uprising and was unable to communicate with key members in Malayan 
society because he had placed himself on a high pedestal. He was replaced by Sir Henry 
Gurney in 1948.90   
Gurney, who eventually died in an ambush, came from a military background.  He 
soon concluded that the war in Malaya was a war of political ideologies. He believed that 
on no account should the military have control of the war.  Gurney’s key contribution to 
the emergency was his decision to resettle over 600,000 Chinese squatters into what 
would be called “new villages.” The Resettlement Policy was the key in successfully 
separating the insurgents from their source of support. The concept was to move the 
squatters to “new villages” where they would be given land, education, and medical care, 
along with other government assistance. A home guard would also be developed to 
protect the “new villages” from the insurgents. 
Although well-suited for the job, Gurney recognized the need for an individual 
whose focus would be strictly to direct and coordinate the operations against the 
insurgents. The person selected as the Director of Operations was the distinguished 
retired general Sir Harold Briggs. He also felt that the emergency was more of a police 
and political affair than a military operation, and believed the key to success was to 
control the squatters who were the primary support for the guerrillas. One of his main 
contributions in the Emergency was to insist on joint thinking and coordination of effort 
at all levels with all of the agencies involved, civilian and military.91  
The Briggs plan has been lauded as the overall strategy that led to the British and 
Malaya government’s success against the MCP. It encompassed a variety of programs 
and was defined by four tenets. The first was to dominate the populated areas and to build 
up a feeling of complete security there, which would eventually result in a steady and 
increasing flow of information from all sources. The second tenet was to break up the 
communist organization within populated areas. The third tenet was to isolate the bandits 
(communist terrorist) from their food and information supply organizations which were 
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in the populated areas. The last tenet was to destroy the bandits by forcing them to attack 
the government forces on the government’s own ground. 92  
The first “Supremo” of the emergency was Sir Gerald Templar, whose role was to 
prepare the country for independence and rid the country of communism. With his 
intelligence background, Templar saw the emergency as an intelligence war. He focused 
on establishing an intelligence gathering network and utilizing the police intelligence 
unit, the Special Branch.93  
The Malayan government’s psychological warfare expert was C. C. Too. He had a 
detailed knowledge of the communist party and how to deal with the communist mindset. 
Prior to the Emergency, he had attended communist meetings and, because of his 
academic prowess, was invited (but declined) to join the party.  Too developed the 
emergency’s psychological warfare philosophy. The first tenet of his philosophy was to 
understand the different personality types within the communist party which he classified 
as the sincere communist, the wavier, and the criminal.  The next tenet was to ensure that 
the concepts and messages fit every kind of communist terrorist. He developed “Too’s 
Rules”: Don’t preach, don’t theorize, never say “I told you so,” and don’t use propaganda 
based on hatred. The importance of Too’s role in the Malaysian Emergency, as 
summarized in the following quote from Richard Clutterbuck:  “It took us some time to 
learn the obvious lesson that psychological warfare must be directed by a local man. It is 
amazing how many Europeans think they understand the Asian mind.”94 
The organization of the MCP involved two distinct categories: the strike force and 
the support group. These forces were arrayed regionally throughout Malaya. The strike 
force derived from the former Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Party, which had fought 
alongside British guerrillas. In the beginning, they had access to caches of weapons and 
equipment that had been airdropped by the British to support guerilla warfare against the 
Japanese because of their connection with the British guerilla forces.95  
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As the war ended and insurgency began, the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese party 
transitioned to the Malayan Peoples Anti-British Party. The strike force’s main 
philosophy was to strike swiftly with murder and terror. The support group for the strike 
force was called the Min Yuen. The Min Yuen consisted primarily of Chinese squatters 
and villagers on the outskirts of the jungle who provided logistical support for the strike 
force and also operated as an intelligence organization. The Min Yuen was clandestine, 
formal and highly efficient.96  
The government also had a strike force, the Ferret Force, made up of small teams 
of British, Gurkha, and Malay soldiers. These small teams, trained in “bush craft” and 
jungle warfare, constituted a small part of the organization that combated the insurgency. 
The main body of the government counter-insurgency organization was the State War 
Executive Committee (SWEC) and the District War Executive Committees (DWEC). 
These committees were truly an interagency task force. The committees were headed by 
civilians, with attached military liaisons with authority to act on time-sensitive 
intelligence. This interagency task force structure proved to be the key in the successful 
coordination and implantation of the Briggs plan.97  
General Chin Peng’s strategy for the conduct of the insurrection was constructed 
in three phases. The first phase—the harassment phase—was designed to cripple the 
British planters and tin miners while increasing guerilla strength through the capture of 
arms and equipment from police posts. Conducting small actions against civilian targets 
and isolated police posts discredited the government and the police and enhanced the 
guerrillas’ image. The second phase—the restricting phase—was meant to drive 
government security forces from the countryside. This phase would lead directly to the 
final phase—the liberated territory phase—which was to be the establishment and 
expansion of liberated areas in insurgent controlled territory. The expansion of the 
liberated areas was to continue until the insurgents controlled all of Malaya.98  
Chin Peng’s strategy had only a few basic requirements: security, intelligence, 
rice, weapons and ammunition. For example, the MCP implemented a campaign of terror 
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in response to the government’s National Registration program.  The National 
Registration Program was intended to provide an accurate account of everyone in the 
country, including, most importantly, the squatters. It also served as the basis for a 
rationing and population control system which allowed the government to utilize the 
carrot and the stick approach as well as to restrict the movements of the insurgents.  The 
MCP campaign of terror was marked by attacks on the registration teams and the burning 
of registration cards taken from the people.  Osman China, the MCP’s propaganda expert, 
devised a brilliant propaganda plan countering the government’s registration program. He 
claimed that the program was a prelude to conscription, would make it easier for the 
government to levy taxes, and that it was a tyrannous enforcement of fascist methods 
devised to consolidate control of the people.99   
The government’s overall strategy was based on several key ideas, the first being 
the realization that this emergency should not be primarily a military action. Second, to 
win against the guerrillas would require separating them from their support base and 
forcing them to attack on the government’s terms.  From these key ideas came the 
National Registration Program, the Resettlement Policy, the SWEC and DWEC, as well 
as the Briggs Plan.  
Another aspect of the Malaya Emergency that contributed to the success of the 
government was the fact that the British maintained military units in the country for 
multiple tours.  They also benefited from the expertise of the British and Malayan civil 
servants with years of local experience. This provided the British with a wealth of 
institutional experience and knowledge. This institutional knowledge, along with the 
assistance of several key Malayans, proved useful in intelligence activities and the 
psychological campaign.  
The government’s psychological campaign had three aims: to encourage 
surrender, sow dissension between insurgent rank-and-file and their leaders, and to create 
an image of the government (both to the insurgents and to the population) as firm, 
efficient, fair and generous.   The primary means of communication used for the 
psychological war (PSYWAR) was radio (in 12 languages), jungle leaflets, and voice 
aircraft. However, the cause of a large number of surrenders was the personal contact and 
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relations between those who had already surrendered and the fighters still in the jungle as 
in the case of the surrender by mail campaign.100   
Malaya became a sovereign independent state on August 31, 1957.101  This had a 
tremendous effect on the insurrection. Although the MCP had already withered to fewer 
than two thousand active fighters as a result of the counterinsurgency efforts thus far, 
Malaysia’s independence took away their primary goal of liberation from British rule.  
The new government continued to use aggressive military action, PSYOPS, and 
monetary rewards to bring an end to the emergency.  The result was a number of mass 
surrenders by the communist terrorist. The Malayan Emergency was declared ended on 
July 31, 1960.102 
One lesson from the Malayan emergency in regards to influence, psychological 
operations and counterinsurgency, is the importance of accurate intelligence.  As Komer 
notes, “In the early days of the Emergency good intelligence was a sometime thing . . . 
Briggs noted the lack of intelligence as a key weakness and stressed improvement.”103 
More specifically, the Malay case points to the importance of  recognizing the type of 
intelligence needed and determining the primary agency responsible for intelligence 
collection in an unconventional environment. Kitson suggests that the adversary’s 
inherent mode of operation provides very little information that can be collected or acted 
upon. Furthermore, military intelligence organizations are not geared for this type of 
intelligence collection.  
The sort of information required cannot, except on rare occasions, be 
provide on a plate by anyone, not even by the intelligence organization. If 
there was a system whereby the intelligence organization could do this, it 
would have been devised years ago and there would be no such thing as 
insurgency because enemy armed groups and their supporters would at 
once be found, harried, tracked down and destroyed by the army and the 
police.104  
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Lieutenant General Sir Walter Walker also supports the idea that the military 
intelligence organization is not best suited for collection in this type of environment.  In 
his reasoning on why “military intelligence should be the servant and not the master of 
the special branch,” he writes,  
It is for the simple reason that the special branch officers and their staffs, 
and their agents, live in the country, speak the language and know the 
people. Indeed they are of the people, whereas army intelligence staffs are 
here today and gone tomorrow and are continually rotating.105 
Another key lesson in influence from the Malayan Emergency can be found in the 
information campaign headed by A. D. C Peterson.106 Peterson recognized the 
correlation between an information campaign having something to sell and the most 
reliable way to sell, which is face to face contact. The product he was selling was 
nationalism and the vessels that carried the message were “progressive young men who, 
after a six week course, would go out into the villages and preach nationalism, using well 
equipped mobile vans with a variety of equipment.”107 The efforts of the face to face 
contact techniques implemented by Peterson were reinforced by movies, radio, 
newspapers, and press releases all tailored to (or at least in the local vernacular of) the 
target audience. Two more lessons appear from this.  It is necessary to reinforce messages 
introduced at the local level with supporting mass media themes.  Further, messages must 
be tailored to target audiences and presented in a manner that will be understood by the 
masses.  
The main lessons from the Malayan emergency are these: 
1) The importance of intelligence and understanding UW intelligence  
2) Different types of intelligence require the right type of intelligence force 
3) Indigenous people should be involved in developing and executing the PSYOP 
campaign 
4) Face to face contact is critical 
                                                 
105 Kitson, 1 
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campaign. Peterson had PSYWAR experience in South East Asia in World War II. 
107 Ibid, 70. 
43 
5) Reinforcing nature of PSYOP at all levels along with information and reward 
programs 
6) Messages should be tailored to their audiences 
C. CONCLUSION 
The cases studies examined in this chapter reveal several key lessons in regards to 
influence in a UW environment. Some of the key lessons include the concept of 
intelligence in the UW environment, the importance of face to face contact, use of 
organizations and networks, as well as the effects of the conditions of the environment on 
an influence campaign.  These lessons, along with the concepts discussed in Chapter II, 
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IV. A MODEL OF GRASSROOTS PSYCHOLOGICAL 
OPERATIONS 
This chapter develops a grassroots psychological model (GRP) based on the 
principles and techniques of influence derived from the materials discussed in Chapters 
Two and Three.  The GRP model is intended for use by specially trained forces in a UW 
environment. Several existing discussions are used as guidelines for framing the GRP 
model, including William McRaven’s relative superiority model (six principles of special 
operations) and Basilici and Simmons’ principles of unconventional warfare.  
The chapter begins with an introduction to the relative superiority model followed 
by the principles of UW.  The last section of the chapter proposes the principles for a 
grassroots psychological operations model, and categorizes various techniques and 
elements according to their usefulness to the principles of GRP. 
A. RELATIVE SUPERIORITY 
 An influential model for special operations is the relative superiority model.  
McRaven says that “relative superiority is a condition that exists when an attacking force, 
generally smaller, gains a decisive advantage over a larger or well defended enemy.”108  
 The concept of relative superiority has three basic properties. The first property is 
that “relative superiority is achieved at the pivotal moment in an engagement.”109 The 
pivotal moment may precede combat; the conditions may be such that once things are set 
in motion, nothing the enemy can do will change the outcome. Applying this to the 
concept of influence in the UW environment, and substituting the target audience for the 
idea of the enemy, this pivotal moment is the tipping point. The pivotal moment—tipping 
point—then becomes dependent on both the physical size of the area of operations and 
the size of the population. For instance, if the target area is a town, then the number of 
people within that target audience who must be influenced for the UW forces to gain 
relative superiority is far smaller than if the target area were a large city.  Achieving 
relative superiority requires that Special Forces have the ability to influence the masses. 
                                                 
108 William H. McRaven, Spec Ops: Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare Theory and Practice 
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Furthermore, “once relative superiority is achieved, it must be sustained in order 
to guarantee victory.”110 This also holds true in the UW environment, as evidenced by 
the Huks’ ability to maintain influence over the people. The Huks initially gained relative 
superiority in comparison to the government’s lack of control and legitimacy, but they 
could not maintain relative superiority and thus were not victorious in the end. Also, in 
the Malayan Emergency the MCP achieved relative superiority with the squatters but 
could not maintain their status when the Resettlement Policy separated insurgents from 
their source of relative superiority.  
The third property of relative superiority is “if relative superiority is lost it is 
difficult to regain.”111 Once the Philippines government overcame the Huks’ relative 
superiority they were able to defeat the insurgents. In the Malayan Emergency, it was 
much easier for the government to overcome the MCP’s relative superiority because the 
MCP had only gained relative superiority among a small portion of the population, the 
ethnic Chinese. Once both insurgent groups lost relative superiority over their population 
base they were never able to regain it. 
McRaven provides a visual depiction of the three properties of relative 




Figure 5.   Sample Relative Superiority Graph113 
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The pivotal moment can be seen as a dramatic rise in the probability of mission 
success.  Sustaining relative superiority and maintaining influence over the population are 
depicted as a gradual rise from the tipping point to mission success. In the UW 
environment the X-axis, time, will be measured in months or years, as it may take that 
long to gain relative superiority; time depends also on the size of the area of operation. 
The intersection of the X and Y-axis is the point of vulnerability (PV). In the UW 
environment, the PV is defined as the first contact between the Special Forces and the 
population, when the reaction of the population is unknown so the frictions of war 
(chance, uncertainty, and the will of the people) have an increased impact on the success 
of the mission. 114 The gray area, the area of vulnerability (AV), is a function of mission 
completion over time. “The longer it takes to gain relative superiority, the larger the area 
of vulnerability, hence the greater the impact of the frictions of war.” The same applies to 
the unconventional warfare environment: the longer it takes to gain relative superiority 
the more impact chance, uncertainty and the will of the people will have on the mission. 
The relative superiority model is a visual depiction on how the frictions of war and time 
affect a grassroots psychological operation. It is useful to the GRP model in that it allows 
planners and operators to conceptualize and analyze a GRP before, during and after the 
operation. 
The six principles of special operations, like the concept of relative superiority, 
are focused on direct action, but some are relevant to UW and GRP as well. Only those 
directly relevant to UW and GRP are discussed below. The six principles of special 
operations are: simplicity, security, repetition, surprise, speed, and purpose.115 Spec Ops 
situates the principles within the three phases of an operation: planning, preparation, and 
execution.116 This same framework is used later in this chapter for organizing the 
principles of GRP in an UW environment.  
1. Planning Phase:  Simplicity 
Simplicity is the only relevant principle in the planning phase. It is characterized 
by three elements: limiting the number of objectives, good intelligence, and innovation. 
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Limiting the number of objectives for GRP means defining specific, vital actions or 
beliefs that one hopes to influence the target audience into doing or believing. The intent 
is to adjust, reshape, or mold the perceptual framework so that indigenous people’s views 
and actions are compatible with short term tactical and long term strategic goals.   
Chapter II notes that compliance professionals in the persuasion industry have 
very limited and specific objectives. They focus on discovering what information would 
most likely influence the target audience and how to tailor that information to improve 
the influence attempt.  In the Philippines, Magsaysay’s psychological campaign had three 
linked objectives change the behavior of government troops in order to increase the 
government’s legitimacy and thereby increase defection from the guerrillas. This case 
exemplifies how interrelated and codependent objectives may be crucial to mission 
success. Determining and limiting the actions one wants from the target audience is the 
first priority of the planning process.  Limiting objectives narrows the scope of the 
strategic goal and allows planners to focus on a nested multilayer approach to the mission 
in order to coordinate and synchronize grassroots psychological operations with the 
supporting mass media propaganda and public diplomacy. For example, in the Malayan 
emergency, the major factor of influence at the tactical level was face to face personal 
contact with the target audience. The messages delivered in these contacts were 
reinforced by other means, but without face to face contact, those other messages would 
be merely enemy propaganda.117    
Another aspect of limiting objectives in a large scale UW operation is determining 
what areas of the population to focus on—which areas will produce the biggest bang for 
the buck as a high value target areas (HVTA), which town, city, or region is more 
susceptible to influence?  Which would have the greatest chance of creating a cascade 
effect? As Krebs’ rules suggest, the community most ripe for influence is one 
predisposed to favor your objectives, or a neutral battleground area without  majority 
support for the enemy—but these areas are also the least likely to generate a cascading 
                                                 
117 Given the UW is defined as a broad spectrum of activities, Limiting Objectives in this context 
refers to the amount of strategic objectives, geographical area and population one GRP force can 
effectively manage. It is also important to note that limiting objectives does not imply limiting the tactics 
and activities employed by the GRP force. 
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affect. In contrast, areas where the population is predisposed to support the enemy may 
have the greatest potential to generate the desired cascading effect. 118  
A second element of simplicity is good intelligence.  Good intelligence in the 
GRP model is distinctly different than good intelligence for direct action missions, 
specifically because the focus is on the target audience rather than on the enemy’s 
capabilities. In the GRP model, intelligence is more clearly tied to the concept of indirect 
intelligence, which is information gathered on a specific community that provides GRP 
operators and planners with detailed information on the individuals, networks, emotions, 
motives and objective reasoning of that community.  Chapter Two describes how the 
persuasion industry focuses its research on the target audience rather than on competitors’ 
capabilities. In the Malayan Emergency, the initial focus of intelligence was the target 
audience.  As with intelligence requirements for any type of special operations, the 
indirect intelligence requirements should be narrow and in-depth, specific and detailed, 
so the operator can fully exploit the advantages of indirect intelligence at the tactical 
level. In other words thorough intelligence on the target audience will increase the initial 
effectiveness of the GRP force.  
Intelligence on the key issues used in the opposition’s propaganda is vital for 
preparing a counterpoint and giving operators a sense of their target audience. As noted 
in the discussion of McAdam’s research, the individual recruitment process is more 
effective in the absence of negative influence.  Knowledge of the negative influences 
increases operators’ ability to counter them. Unlike the persuasion industry, planners for 
operations in UW environments probably will not have access to the intended target 
audience prior to the mission, which limits information-gathering. However, intelligence 
is an ongoing process and with the protracted nature of UW, the SF force can develop the 
detailed information required for the effective application of the GRP model once on the 
ground--as opposed to the need for detailed intelligence prior to a short duration direct 
action mission, where the operators do not have the time to develop or gather 
intelligence.  
Nonetheless, it is imperative that the planners use innovative ways to gather 
information, such as analyzing the local media or consulting with people in neighboring 
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countries and immigrants from a particular region to the US.  Innovation, the third 
element of simplicity, is valuable because it “simplifies a plan by helping to avoid or 
eliminate obstacles that would otherwise compromise surprise and or complicate the 
rapid execution of the mission.”119 One obstacle in the application of the GRP model is 
the one just discussed—the problem of getting detailed information on the target 
audience. “Innovation is normally manifested in new technology, but it is also the 
application of unconventional tactics.”120 In this sense, innovation is an integral and 
inherent part of GRP.   
2. Preparation Phase:  Security and Familiarization 
For the grassroots psychological operations model, the preparation phase consists 
of security and thorough familiarization with detailed information on the target 
audience.121In the preparation phase, security is a key principle of direct action special 
operations. Security in the UW environment remains relevant in the same way as for 
direct action:  “The purpose of tight security is to prevent the enemy from gaining an 
advantage through foreknowledge of the impending attack [UW mission].”122 For 
example, the enemy in UW may be successful in desensitizing the population to the GRP 
operators long before their arrival.  Creating population immunity to the special 
operator’s message makes the influence process harder and increases the time to achieve 
relative superiority, thus increasing the special operators’ area of vulnerability. More 
likely and with greater consequences for the GRP force, the enemy may increase their 
control of the target area such that the operation cannot be conducted.  Because UW is 
inherently covert, clandestine and politically sensitive, such missions must be protected 
and secure to insure the political will to support them.  
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A similar concept to the principle of repetition that is relevant in preparing for a 
GRP mission is a thorough familiarization with intelligence on the target audience.123 
Familiarization should include interaction with people from the area of operation or from 
a similar background.  As with the persuasion industry, familiarization will allow 
operators to develop profiles of the target audience and mold their message appropriately. 
Familiarization will also provide operators with a sense of what to expect, potential 
problem areas, possible counters to their message, and the information needed to help 
establish a favorable climate for their influence attempt utilizing the principles of 
“landscaping” and “pre-persuasion” discussed in Chapter II. 
3. Execution Phase:  Speed/Timing and Purpose 
Because the focus of grassroots psychological operations is the target audience, 
the special operation principle of surprise, or “catching the enemy off guard,”124 is not 
directly relevant to the unconventional warfare environment.  However, the timing of 
implementation can make a significant difference in the outcome, as was suggested in the 
discussion of social proof as a weapon of influence. Social proof is most effective in 
times of uncertainty and confusion, and a GRP operation can create or take advantage of 
uncertainty and confusion through landscaping or pre-persuasion. The operators’ security 
and the achievement of relative superiority depends more on how quickly the operators 
establish a positive relationship with the target audience, suggest Basilici and Simmons, 
who note that “UW operators gain their best security when friendly indigenous personnel 
are around them.”125 This and other factors make speed a necessary principle of the GRP 
model. 
In the GRP model, as with the direct action special operations model, the 
underlying reason for speed—to reduce the area of vulnerability and increase the chance 
of gaining relative superiority—is exactly the same.  In the GRP model, however, speed 
and timing are critical to establishing a positive relationship with the target audience.  
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The importance of speed and timing are to protect the security of the operators and to 
take advantage of an uncertain situation so they can get a “foot in the door.”  Speed and 
timing are also important in the transition from “power authority” to “sovereign 
authority.” The faster the GRP operators can transition from power authority to sovereign 
authority, the lower the likelihood of a backlash or resentment in the target audience. 
Speed and timing are also relevant to the GRP in relation to initiating the processes of 
“emergent mobilization” and “scale shift” discussed in chapter II. The relative superiority 
line lies somewhere in the vicinity of these two processes, and the faster the GRP 
operators can get to these processes, the faster they will have achieved relative 
superiority. 
Purpose, as it relates to direct action missions, is “understanding and then 
executing the prime objective of mission regardless of emerging obstacles or 
opportunities.”126 The concept translates exactly the same in the UW environment and as 
a principle for GRP. The two requirements of purpose, that it be clearly defined in the 
mission statement and that it involves personal commitment, hold true in the GRP model. 
The clearly defined purpose in the GRP model refers to the specific actions you want the 
target audience to take in support of the mission’s objectives. Having the purpose clearly 
defined in the mission statement insures that the GRP operator understands the overall 
objective and allows the operator, in the face of changing circumstances, to use ingenuity 
in successfully completing the mission.  With the decentralized nature of Special Forces 
operations in a UW environment (more so than in a DA mission), a clearly stated purpose 
is invaluable. Personal commitment is also more valuable in a UW mission and for GRP 
than in a DA mission because of the inherent frictions of UW. For example, the 
psychological impacts on the GRP operator are not present for the DA operator.  The 
mission’s long duration and isolation, the relatively slow feedback, the effects of the 
physical environment and harsh living conditions—all can have a negative impact on the 
operator’s mental health. Therefore, a strong sense of purpose that leads to personal 
commitment can help sustain the GRP operator for the duration of the mission. 
In summary, drawing from the discussion in the preceding chapters, the concepts 
contributing to relative superiority and the six principles of special operations, with slight 
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modification, apply to the grassroots psychological operations model for the UW 
environment. It is clear that the relative superiority paradigm can be applied to GRP and 
UW with the understanding that the protracted nature of UW significantly lengthens the 
time axis. As for the six principles of special operation, in the planning phase the 
principle of simplicity is relevant to GRP as it advocates limiting objectives (actions to be 
taken by the target audience and determining the HVTA), good intelligence (indirect 
intelligence), and innovation. In the preparation phase, security has the same purpose for 
GRP as it does for direct action missions. Thorough familiarization with the target 
audience is more important than repetition for GRP missions in the UW environment. In 
the execution phase, speed and timing are relevant to the GRP model, given the 
understanding that for GRP, speed and timing pertain to the establishment of positive 
relationships, transition between the types of authority and initiation of the processes of 
emergent mobilization and scale shift. The principle of purpose translates directly from 
the special operations model to the GRP model and may even have a greater impact as it 
pertains to personal commitment in a UW environment.  
B. THE PRINCIPLES OF UW 
In the absence of specific principles of unconventional warfare, Basilici and 
Simmons developed a set of UW principles derived from their analysis of the principles 
of military operations other then war. 127 Given that grassroots psychological operations 
are intended for use in the UW environment, it is relevant to analyze the applicability of 
these principles to the GRP model. It is important to note that success in a UW 
environment requires a mix of both direct and indirect means. The focus of GRP is on 
indirect means to accomplish given objectives. It will work in support of the overall 
unconventional warfare paradigm. Basilici and Simmons propose five principles of UW: 
overlapping objectives, decontrol, restraint, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy. Of 
these, three are relevant to GRP efforts: overlapping objectives, perseverance, and 
fostering legitimacy.128  
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Overlapping objectives is the idea that “US military objectives must overlap with 
the indigenous force’s political objectives.”129 Basilici and Simmons suggest that if the 
objectives are not congruent, it would be extremely difficult for the US to achieve its 
military objectives. Several of the concepts presented thus far in this thesis support the 
UW principle of overlapping objectives. In discussing influence, market researcher Frank 
Luntz suggests that “it doesn’t matter what you want to tell the public, it’s about what 
they want to hear.”130 This demonstrates the requirement to understand the needs or 
objectives of the target audience. In both the Philippine and Malayan cases, the 
insurgents’ themes appealed to their target audiences and thus they gained needed support 
from the people. In both cases, when the government recognized and addressed the needs 
and objectives of the people, they won back popular support. Having overlapping 
objectives is essential to influencing the target audience, with one caveat. As the 
commitment and consistency weapon of influence from Chapter II suggests, overlapping 
objectives is only crucial in gaining the initial commitment; after that, the target audience 
will develop internal motivations to remain consistent with their commitment. 
Perseverance, as a principle, “is best understood in the context that UW 
operations take time to develop.”131 This holds true for GRP and is important enough to 
be a principle of GRP. The ability to sustain the operation in a UW environment is 
paramount to mission accomplishment as demonstrated by the time spans in which the 
Huk rebellion and the Malayan Emergency took place.  
Fostering legitimacy suggests that UW operations with legitimacy have a better 
chance of long term success. This principle supports the implications of the need to 
transition from power authority to sovereign authority as quickly as possible. This thesis 
asserts that the transition between the types of authorities is a critical step to maintaining 
relative superiority in the UW environment. Once the transition (which may be 
transparent) is accomplished, the probability of influencing the target audience will 
increases as the probability of rejection decreases. Legitimacy increases the effects of the  
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weapons of influence of “authority,” “liking,” and “social proof,” and it aids in creating a 
relationship with the target audience. Legitimacy is a relevant principle for the GRP 
model. 
To summarize, from the work of Basilici and Simmons on principles of UW, one 
can derive three principles relevant to the grassroots psychological model: overlapping 
objectives, perseverance, and fostering legitimacy.  
C. A MODEL OF GRASSROOTS PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS 
The models discussed above—relative superiority (six principles of special 
operations) and three of the five principles of unconventional warfare—along with 
concepts and principles discussed in earlier chapters provide the foundation for the 
following model of grassroots psychological operations. Because GRP operations are 
planned, not spontaneous, the model is organized in three phases:  the planning, 
preparation, and execution phases. 
1. Planning Phase 
 The planning phase involves two principles:  simplicity and overlapping 
objectives.  
1) The Principle of Simplicity.  This principle involves three elements.  The first is 
to limit the number of objectives or actions to be taken by the target audience.  
The second is good intelligence, which aids in determining the high value target 
areas of operations.  Indirect intelligence is information gathered on a specific 
community that provides detailed information on the individuals, networks, 
emotions, motives and objective reasoning of that community.  The third element, 
innovation, aids in avoiding or eliminating obstacles that would otherwise 
compromise surprise and or would complicate the rapid execution of the mission. 
2) The Principle of Overlapping Objectives.  The GRP objectives must overlap with 
the target audience’s needs, interest and objectives. 
2. Preparation Phase 
 The preparation phase also requires attention to two principles:  security and 
familiarization. 
3) The Principle of Security is defined as preventing the enemy from gaining an 
advantage through foreknowledge of the impending UW mission. 
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4) The Principle of Familiarization prescribes a thorough familiarization with 
intelligence on the target audience.  Familiarization should include as much 
interaction as possible with indigenous people from the area of operation. 
3. Execution Phase 
 The execution phase involves four principles:  relative speed, fostering 
legitimacy, perseverance, and purpose. 
5) The Principle of Relative Speed and timing are defined as the time it will take to 
establish positive relationships, transition from power authority to sovereign 
authority, and initiate the processes of mobilization and scale shift.  
6) The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy involves conveying to the target audience 
that the overlapping objectives are well-reasoned and sincere, and that these 
objectives are pursued under sovereign authority.   
7) The Principle of Perseverance entails understanding the long duration of UW.  
Operators involved with GRP operations must have the wherewithal to overcome 
adversity if they hope to succeed in these long-term missions.  
8) The Principle of Purpose requires having a clearly defined purpose that is related 
to the specific actions you want the target audience to take in support of the 
objectives of the mission.  The principle of purpose allows the operator, in the 
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Table 1.   Principles of Grassroots Psychological Operations 
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D. CONCLUSION 
These eight principles will be useful to UW planners and the operators that work 
in an environment where indirect means of influence are extremely important to the 
accomplishment of the mission objectives. More importantly, understanding the 
underlying elements and techniques that shaped the eight principles will allow the UW 
specialist to adapt them to the ever changing environment and cultural context of 


























V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
This thesis investigates the art of influence and how non-lethal influence 
techniques can be used by SF in a UW environment. The intent is to provide a document 
that planners and operators can use to guide and improve their probability of success in 
influencing the target audience in a manner less likely to produce blowback and more 
likely to have lasting effects. The product of the research is eight principles of grassroots 
psychological (GRP) operations. Given the nature of the conflicts and threats faced by the 
United States today, continued research on the art of influence and its military 
applications will be invaluable to UW operators and planners.  
The research is based on several premises introduced in Chapter I. These include 
the strategic utility of Special Forces and its historic link to UW and PSYOPS, the 
importance of the contested population, the problem of blowback from direct means of 
control, and the importance of understanding the art of influence and the psychological 
factors that contribute to successful influence attempts in the UW environment. 
Chapter II assumed that mass media and propaganda are not as effective at 
influencing people as is face to face contact. This chapter defined the “hearts and minds” 
problem and introduced the concentric circles of influence. Most importantly, the chapter 
surveyed the commercial, political and academic research of cognitive and social 
psychology on techniques and principles for influencing human behavior, outlining many 
techniques and principles for influencing individuals, as well as the influence impact of 
social networks. Many of the influence techniques and elements described in this chapter 
support the overarching principles of the GRP model.  
Because unconventional warfare is a form of war, environmental factors will 
naturally affect the art of influence. Therefore, Chapter III presented two case studies of 
influence in unconventional warfare environments: the Huk Rebellion in the Philippines 
and the Malayan Emergency. The analysis found that some of the elements of influence 
were consistent with the discussion in the previous chapter, while other elements were 
specific to the unconventional warfare environment. Among the most significant 
elements of influence are soldiers’ (positive) interactions with the target audience, efforts 
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to counter the opponents’ theme, the intelligence organization’s focus, involving the 
indigenous people in the GRP operation, and the need to coordinate levels and types of 
influence, information operations, and propaganda to be mutually supporting and 
reinforcing. 
To situate the elements of influence within a comprehensible and applicable 
model, Chapter IV analyzed those elements in the context of two established models:  
one focused on direct action special operations and one on unconventional warfare.  
The principles of grassroots psychological operations derived from this analysis 
are placed in a three-phase model (planning, preparation, and execution). The eight 
principles are: 
1) The Principle of Simplicity 
2) The Principle of Overlapping Objectives 
3) The Principle of Security 
4) The Principle of Familiarization 
5) The Principle of Relative Speed 
6) The Principle of Fostering Legitimacy 
7) The Principle of Perseverance 
8) The Principle of Purpose 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR APPLICATION 
The GRP model is intended to work in conjunction with or in support of other 
models that encompass the entire spectrum of activities in an UW conflict.132 The 
primary beneficiaries of this model will be those who habitually operate in UW 
environments, namely Special Forces. This author recommends that, at minimum, a block 
of instruction in the art of influence and grassroots psychological operations be 
established for UW operators as a part of their qualification training. Such a course 
should present, in detail, the underlying elements of cognitive and social psychology that 
impact the influence process. In addition, this training should be developed to accompany 
cultural awareness training. 
 
 
                                                 
132 One example is the “Mystic Diamond,” a model developed by Professor Gordon McCormick and 
presented in his 2005 Seminar in Guerrilla Warfare, (Monterey CA: Naval Postgraduate School). 
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C. SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This thesis introduced eight principles of grassroots psychological operations, 
which are elements of influence relevant to unconventional warfare. To validate or refine 
the model, using the GRP model to assess additional historical UW cases would be 
useful. Another area for future research is a comparison of the GRP model to current 
psychological operations. Also, the development of a GRP critical task list derived from 
the principles and techniques developed in this thesis would be invaluable to UW 
planners and operators. Finally, a GRP influence index that would estimate the 
probability of an influence attempt’s success is worth researching, and would be a 
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